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IN HONOR OF A SIMPLE-MINDED
ORIGINALIST
MORAL PUZZLES AND LEGAL PERPLEXITIES:
ESSAYS ON THE INFLUENCE OF LARRY
ALEXANDER. Edited by Heidi M. Hurd.1 Cambridge
University Press. 2019. Pp. xxvi + 463. $110.00 (Cloth).
James Allan2
In May, 2017 the Yale Law School’s Center for Law and
Philosophy, together with the University of Illinois’ Program in
Law and Philosophy, co-hosted a conference at the alma mater of
Larry Alexander, Yale Law School. The conference brought
together eminent legal scholars in the areas of criminal law
theory, constitutional law theory, jurisprudence and moral
philosophy. They were there to honor Professor Larry Alexander
of the University of San Diego School of Law, and the result of
that celebratory conference, or Festschrift (in these more globalist
times), is this very recently published Cambridge University Press
book. And my, oh my, it is a very good book indeed. I mean that
not just in the sense of it being good compared to the usual booklength edited collection of two dozen odd essays that have to be
stuffed between two covers. I mean it is a really good book even
by the standards of a well-crafted, sole-authored monograph. The
editor, Heidi Hurd, has done an excellent job of fitting together
into a coherent whole all 22 contributing authors’ essays or
chapters, together with her own introduction and a last-wordreply-to-everyone final say by Alexander himself.
The book has four Parts, namely (and in order) “Puzzles in
Criminal Law,” “Problems in Constitutional Law,” “Perplexities
in Jurisprudence,” and “Parodoxes in Moral Philosophy.” Given
the usual interests of the readers of this journal, I will focus on just
1. Ross and Helen Workman Chair in Law and Professor of Philosophy, University
of Illinois.
2. Garrick Professor in Law, T.C. Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland.
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the middle two of those Parts, which in various ways elucidate
important issues that bear on constitutional law—though, let me
here say that any readers with more catholic tastes will find
fascinating the Part I chapters on such things as desert-based
punishment, whether failed criminal attempts are less culpable
than those that succeed, and the best understanding of duress
(with Alexander’s end-of-book replies) together with the Part IV
chapters that raise such topics as threshold deontology and the
difficulty in theorizing wrongful discrimination (with Alexander
at the end doubting that any account of discrimination’s
wrongfulness can succeed and defending deontology with
thresholds). I suppose the prefatory point is that Alexander is a
man of wide-ranging interests in law who brings a powerful
analytical mind to bear on all sorts of theoretical legal issues. You
learn from him even when you ultimately disagree with him (as
this reviewer does as regards, say, the comparative attractions of
consequentialism and deontology). Surely that’s one of the
highest compliments one can receive.
In what follows, however, I will cleave to the book’s Parts II
and III, the constitutional law-related contributions. And most
obviously that brings me to the question of constitutional
interpretation because Larry Alexander is a leading proponent of
originalism, of the old school (and these days very minority)
intentionalist variety. As a self-described “simple-minded
originalist,”3 Alexander embraces his position firstly as a thesis
about how language is used, secondly as one about the nature of
all interpretation, and thirdly in normative terms about why in
interpreting we should defer to the intended meanings of the
authors of legal texts—so it is all three for Alexander, semantic,
pragmatic and normative. In fact, in his end-of-book reply
Alexander lays out an abbreviated step-by-step account of his
position, one which I am here further condensing:
1. A text . . . is a set of symbols . . . that is meant by its
3. Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF
ORIGINALISM 87 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011); see also Larry
Alexander, Telepathic Law, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 139 (2010) (describing Originalist
interpretation akin to telepathic communication); Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why
and the What, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 539 (2013) (arguing ignoring authorial intent
undermines the endeavour the drafter undertook); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna
Prakash, “Is that English You’re Speaking?” Some Arguments for the Primacy of Intent in
Interpretation, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967 (2004) (distinguishing intentionalist from
textualist interpretations of law).
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producer—the author(s)—to communicate a message to
the intended audience . . . .
2. If there is no author—no person who produced the marks,
sounds, etc. in order to convey a message—we do not have
a text. The marks . . . may be a sign of something, much as
smoke is a sign of fire . . . . Marks that might look like
symbols, when we understand they are not—think of cloud
formations that resemble the letters C-A-T—render
certain questions nonsensical that would make sense were
there an author . . . .
3. Texts are individuated by the messages their authors are
intending to convey thereby. That is why the text of the US
Constitution in Spanish can be the same as its text in
English . . . .
4. When our interest is in the actual authors of a text and the
message they intended to convey thereby, we are acting as
“originalists.” . . .
5. The “conventional meanings” of words—what meaning
dictionaries would assign them—are merely the meanings
most people at a particular time and in a particular locale
would intend to convey by those words. These meanings
are therefore time and place bound, and can and do change
over time and from place to place. But authors may, and
often do, employ unconventional meanings. . . . If their
intended audience understands [what the authors are
unconventionally doing], then the authors can be successful
in conveying their message to their intended audience . . . .
6. Authors rely on implicatures and implicitures in conveying
their intended messages. They often mean more, and
sometimes less, than they actually say. . . .
...
7. [Turning now explicitly to interpreting legal texts:] In
whomever the authority to enact legal norms resides . . .
then, when they decide which norms to enact and attempt
to communicate those norms through a written or oral text,
the job of the intended audience is to figure out what norms
the authors enacted and intended to communicate. If the
audience chooses legal norms that differ from those the
authors chose to enact and communicate, the authority of
the authors is undermined. Only originalism is authority-
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preserving.
8. Any departure from originalism either transfers authority
from the authors to someone else—for example, to
judges—or to some mindless process, such as the process
by which the meanings of words change over time . . . .
9. . . . [N]onoriginalist interpretation really represents a
transfer of authority . . . from one body or person to
another or to some mindless (nonplanning) process. . . .
10. Interpretation of texts is an empirical, not a normative,
endeavor. The interpreter wants to know what norm the
authorities intended to communicate through their text. It
is often quite difficult to answer the interpreter’s question.
The authorities may have expressed their intended norm
poorly. Or the text may be old or ambiguous, and the
context of its promulgation unclear or unknown. But,
however difficult interpretation may be, it is unavoidable if
the norms we are to be governed by are the norms those
with authority to govern us intended.
11. Finally, interpretation must deal with the fact that some
legal authorities are multimember bodies, and sometimes
bicameral multimember bodies, and can enact legal norms
only with the concurrence of majorities or supermajorities.
What is the intended meaning of a legal text when the
members who voted to enact it did not intend to convey the
same meanings and, hence, the same norms by it? This is
the aggregation problem. In my view, it cannot be avoided.
And when there is no shared meaning that the requisite
number of norm enactors endorse, then the text they enact
is legal gibberish. . . . Perhaps that unfortunate result is rare.
Perhaps it can be avoided by having those who vote for the
text accept the meaning intended by some person or
committee without having that meaning in mind
themselves. I see no way, however, to make the
aggregation problem disappear without at the same time
undermining the authority of those who are supposed to
possess it. (pp. 415-418).
That, at its core, is the strand of originalism often dubbed
Original Intended Meaning or “OIM” originalism. Larry
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Alexander, along with Richard Kay4 and (in his later works)
Stanley Fish,5 are probably its best-known and most insightful
proponents. At any rate, this OIM or “old originalist” camp is a
small one, certainly much smaller than the other main strand of
originalism, which most often travels under the moniker Original
Public Meaning or “OPM” or even new originalism. And that
takes us back to Part II of the book, because four of the seven
chapters in this Part are by contributors who, in one way or
another, attack OIM (or in Alexander’s own self-descriptive
terms “simple-minded”) originalism. Connie Rosati (chapter
nine), Fred Schauer (chapter twelve), Larry Solum (chapter
eleven) and Jeff Goldsworthy (chapter ten) all take issue with
Alexander’s OIM strand of originalism. Rosati, the most
sweeping of the four in terms of her skepticism of the Alexander
position, has the least seeming sympathy for any sort of originalist
approach to interpretation. Though she nowhere in the chapter
lays her own cards on the table, the reader will bet she is some
sort of “Living Constitution” or possibly Dworkinian adherent.
Be that as it may, she proceeds to catalogue a bevy of potential
deficiencies as regards the OIM position. And yet, in his
concluding response at book’s end, I think Alexander
convincingly answers all of Rosati’s points—that his position is a
semantic, pragmatic and normative one, all three; that OPM
originalists also seek the author’s intended meaning, they just do
so by restricting themselves to the publicly available evidence at
the time of promulgation; that, yes, it is coherent to talk of
“sentence meaning,” but that is nothing more than a shorthand
for “what most speakers (authors) at a particular time and place
would mean had they uttered (written) the text in question”6 (p.
419); and that the group intentions or aggregation problem is
indeed a real one, but that it “is one not avoided by public
meaning originalists.” (p. 419).
Schauer’s chapter is bifurcated, though both halves focus on
4. See, e.g., Richard Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional
Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703 (2009) (arguing for interpreters’ suspension of their
own views in interpreting the Constitution); Richard Kay, Construction, Originalist
Interpretation and the Complete Constitution, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE 1 (2017)
(noting that intentionalism will lead to clearer outcomes in constitutional arguments).
5. See Stanley Fish, The Intentionalist Thesis Once More, in CHALLENGE, supra note
3, at 99 (arguing the intentionalism elicits the true meaning of constitutional text).
6. Indeed, Alexander goes on to note that “we can always ask what a text would
mean had it been authored by someone other than its actual author.” (p. 419).
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the lawmaker’s intentions. The first half looks at Alexander’s
freedom of speech writings,7 Schauer here agreeing with
Alexander that “the focus in evaluating the constitutionality of
some speech-related state action or rule must be on governmental
intent”—Is it seeking to limit speech based on its content only?
and not on the effect of a governmental action” (p. 209). So in a
world where virtually all governmental actions will have direct or
indirect effects on who can say what, and when neither speaker’s
intent nor the consequences of the government action ought to be
central considerations of constitutionality; the focus “must be on
why government is taking the action under challenge” (p. 209).
Schauer is very interesting here in setting out, and agreeing with,
Alexander’s position. He even moots the notion that “we might
understand constitutional rights and constitutional adjudication
generally as being more about disabling government than about
empowering citizens …[from which it is but a short step] to the
conclusion that governmental motives ought to be the touchstone
of the inquiry [not just as regards freedom of speech, but for
freedom of religion, equal protection, and more.]” (pp. 212-213).
However, in the second half of Schauer’s chapter, when he
turns to the persuasiveness or otherwise of OIM, the agreement
with Alexander goes out the window. Well, in fact, the two
thinkers do agree that the core function of law—in a world of wellmeaning people who unavoidably have reasonable moral and
political disagreements amongst themselves—is to deliver a
settlement of those disagreements, a sort of second-best solution
in a world where that is as good as can ever be on offer. (pp. 218219). Where they then most noticeably differ, and it flows from
that agreed premise, is on whether ‘going with the conventional
meaning and forget about intended meaning, even when the two
conflict’—what Alexander describes as “mindless law” (p. 425)—
provides a desirable settlement function. Schauer says: “Or, to put
it more bluntly, conventional meaning textualism might suck, but
at some times and in some places and on some subjects it might
7. As does Brian Leiter in chapter seven, who agrees with Alexander that in essence
the case for protecting speech boils down to a distrust of government. Both recognize that
the content of speech can cause serious harms. But in any cost-benefit calculation, the
dangers of handing too much regulatory say to those currently in power is such that you
are better off [in Alexander’s words] with “a heavy judicial thumb on the scale against the
validity of certain types of regulations of the content of expression.” (p. 427, Leiter’s
formulation being on p. 128) Leiter then takes the discussion into the realm of academic
freedom, where again he and Alexander agree. (p. 427).
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suck less than original intent originalism” (p. 219). Alexander
replies that he “think[s] mindless law should be an anathema. The
vision it conjures is of lawmakers choosing symbols but then some
mindless process determining what they shall mean. . . . [like]
consulting the entrails of an ox or the oracle of Delphi. For all the
many imperfections of human lawmakers and of those seeking to
glean the lawmakers’ intended meanings, I think we should prefer
them to the mindlessness of non-existent8 conventional
meanings.” (p. 425).
I side with Alexander on this issue of whether conventional
meaning interpretation ought to act as the settlement function; it
should not. And I side with Alexander, not just for the reasons he
gives above, which boil down to the persuasive claim that a
locked-in commitment to doing one’s best to find intended
meaning will suck a lot less—on average, over time—than just
applying dictionary definitions (or however it is you think
conventional meaning can be cashed out), even when you know
for certain no one intended them. I also suspect the Schauer
defence of conventional meaning textualism, whether he intends
it to be or not, can function as a sort of disguised vehicle for
handing more power to those at the point-of-application of laws,
the judges. Conventional meanings absent actual human
intentions, at the very least, will deliver a lot more uncertainty
which some living being today will have to reduce, remove or
resolve. Likewise this textualism will force answers we know to be
wrong. (When Snoop Dog describes something as “bad,” are we
really going to insist, everywhere and always, that the evaluation
is an unfavorable one?) Likewise again, when conventional
meanings suck more than answers delivered by some other
approach, do we not suspect, all of us, that the judges will abandon
conventionalism? And, anyway, what sucks for one of today’s
judges might not suck for one of today’s voters—so who made the
judge the effective lawgiver, which he or she by default becomes
when imposing the mindless law? And why should I as that voter
feel there is any legitimacy to such judge-made or made-by-noone law, to the extent of obeying it? At any rate, read the debate
between these two deep thinkers, and sometime collaborators,
and decide for yourself on this one.
8. They are “non-existent” given Alexander’s point 2 above— i.e., his denial that
marks on paper have any meaning, conventional or otherwise, “in the absence of the
assumption of some author who means something by them.” (p. 424).
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That brings me to Larry Solum and Jeff Goldsworthy, both
of whom are themselves originalists. So here we move into the
intra-family debates, where these two contributors’ positions are
in agreement with the Alexandrian one vastly more often than
not, and where their competing interpretive approaches will
overwhelmingly deliver the same outcomes as Alexander’s. We
are talking about disagreements at the outer margins of the
known originalist solar system, in other words. Solum may well be
America’s leading OPM originalist, certainly he is one of them,
and Goldsworthy is Australia’s best known originalist, bar none.
Start with Solum, who helpfully situates OIM within the wider
originalist family (p. 191) after having noted that “[i]ntentions are
essential for meaning, but this does not entail the conclusion that
the meaning of a text must be the meaning the author intended to
communicate.” (p. 190). When I come to Goldsworthy in a
moment, I will come back to this question of the meaning of
“meaning,” but Solum’s idea is that a text can mean more than
what its author(s) intended—as the “existence of conventional
semantic meanings is entirely consistent with the notion that
intentions must play a role in the production of meaning.” (p.
196). In other words, conventional meanings are a function of
intended meanings, which is why Solum’s OPM strand and
Alexander’s OIM strand of originalism, “are likely to produce
identical [interpretive] results except in cases where there was a
failure of constitutional communication.” (p. 192). Authors’
intentions are crucial to both, it is just that Solum wants to stake
out the position, in contrast to Alexander, that “conventional
semantic meanings are not identical with or reducible to
individual communicative intentions, nor are they supervenient
on such meanings.” (p. 197), so that the “public meaning of a
constitutional provision is the meaning that the provision had for
the public at the time the provision was framed and ratified.” (p.
199). Hence, under the Solum framework, you potentially have
public meaning as well as author’s meaning, and while “author’s
meaning and public meaning may differ, there are good reasons
to believe that they will converge most (or almost all) of the time.”
(p. 199). Still, “there are situations where the two meanings can
diverge.” (p. 199). When they do, says Solum, “a choice must be
made” (p.200), with the moniker OPM being a big clue as to how
he thinks you should choose. There are some even more minor
quibbles between Solum and Alexander, but that claim, with
OPM’s preference for public meaning when they diverge, is the
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core dispute,9 and at the heart of the back and forth debate
between them.
That said, I want to take up this debate between OIM and
OPM originalists, not least because I am one of the rare few who
has changed his mind in the unusual direction (after reading the
likes of Alexander and Kay) and moved away from OPM to
thinking OIM is the more persuasive branch. And I want to do so
by focussing more on Goldsworthy’s chapter, though truth be told
readers will struggle to put a piece of paper between the core
Solum and Goldsworthy positions. I think I just find
Goldsworthy’s terminology easier to use for the non-aficionado,
as he talks in terms of subjective intentionalism (“SI”), objective
intentionalism (“OI”), and public meaning originalism
(“PMO”)—while noting that “[PMO] . . . is often a version of
OI[,]” (p. 182) with Goldsworthy earlier stating explicitly that, in
his view, “Larry Solum’s public meaning originalism [is] a version
of the [OI] position.” (p. 170). Accordingly, the debate that
interests Goldsworthy is between OIs like him, and SIs like
Alexander (and, full disclosure one more time, like me). It is, as I
said, an intra-familial dispute and Goldsworthy sees it as one
where “SI maintains that judges should seek the lawmaker’s
actual subjective intentions, whereas OI holds that those
intentions are relevant only insofar as they were publicly
manifested, in that sufficient evidence of them was made readily
available to the public or at least to legal advisers.” (p.175).
Remember, both SI and OI put much weight on authors’
intentions. Indeed, both camps agree that non-originalist
interpretive approaches, from “Living Constitutionalism” to
“moral readings” on to “Dworkinian best-fit approaches,”
transfer authority from the author to the point-of-application
interpreter (or to some mindless process). And recall that
Alexander and his fellow SI types think that intended meaning is
the uptake an author wants to produce in his or her audience,
which OI does not seem to dispute. Or put differently, texts are
the messages authors intend to convey.
9. Though one key reply Alexander offers to one of these peripheral disputes is that
“it is quite possible to intend another’s intended meaning[,]” (p. 424) such that there is
nothing incoherent in holding the view that some or many ratifiers might have intended
whatever meaning the authors of the Constitution intended—just as “‘I might intend to
convey whatever she intends to convey by that text’” might be the stance one takes “when
voting in a faculty meeting on a proposal drafted by a committee that [one is] too lazy or
uninterested to read, much less understand.” (p. 424).
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Accordingly, the nub of the theoretical disagreement
between OIs and SIs centers on situations in which an author or
authors fail to communicate the meaning he, she, or they intend
to communicate. There is misunderstanding. There is
miscommunication. Suppose, for instance, that in uttering a
statement you intend to communicate to your chosen audience
message X, but most or all of that audience (based on the publicly
available evidence) understands Y. Now, one can at this point ask
the theoretical question of whether the meaning of the statement
was X or Y. And that depends, as it were, on the meaning of
“meaning”—is it a) what you as author intended them to take you
to have meant by your statement, or is it b) what your audience is
likely to take you to have meant by your statement? Goldsworthy
says, and I think Solum concurs, that it is b). “[W]hen your
utterance fails to communicate your meaning to your intended
audience (through your fault not theirs), but communicates some
other meaning to them instead, that other meaning—and not your
meaning—must be the meaning of your utterance.” (p. 178)
(emphasis added).
But to my mind there is no “must” about it. Alexander’s reply
is that Goldsworthy “seems to . . . trade on a confusion between
what is said and what is meant. Or, to put it in terms that I think
are more apt, “Goldsworthy’s distinction is between what your
audience is likely to take you to have meant by your statement
and what you intended them to take you to have meant by it.” (p.
420). I would put it this way: this debate about the best or
preferable understanding of “meaning” is not a dictionary
dispute; it is not a definitional matter. Just as H.L.A. Hart makes
clear in chapter 9 of The Concept of Law,10 when urging readers
to adopt a wider rather than a narrower understanding of “law”
(i.e., one that includes the morally egregious), this is not an “is”
matter but an “ought” one. How should we understand law? And
Hart gives a list of utilitarian reasons for adopting the wider
understanding.
Likewise here. The debate between OIs and SIs is on the
“ought” level: how should we understand what counts as the
meaning of a text? Because it seems clear to me that a person
could, if he or she wished, specify or announce or designate that
the dictionary understanding of “meaning” henceforth would be
10.

H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 181–207 (1961).
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either a) or b) above. Similarly, pointing to what courts presently
do (as Goldsworthy does to buttress his side of the argument (pp.
171-172)) is on the “is” plane. At most, it tells us what judges
today treat as falling within the aegis of “meaning,” but that is not
an answer on the theoretical plane of how “meaning” should be
understood. There, on that theoretical plane, the question is
which understanding is preferable. Here are some of my own
grounds for siding with Alexander and Kay (and in a way with
that well-known SI Humpty Dumpty) and saying it is a)—that
meaning should be understood as being what you, the author,
intended it to be; it should not be understood as being what the
audience took it to be, however justified in doing so that audience
may have been.
1. Alexander’s view makes “meaning” an empirical question.
Goldsworthy’s makes it in part a normative or value-laden (or
added value-laden) question. Goldsworthy seemingly concedes
that his “meaning is what the audience understands” view entails
the fact that there can be different meanings for different
audience members (p. 185). “If this is a bullet . . . then OI must
bite it” (p. 185) concedes Goldsworthy, with a proviso that SI can
lead to the same utterance having different meanings for different
listeners as well if that is what the author intends—think of coded
messages to spies in occupied Europe. But that proviso is weak.
The author’s meaning for the Gestapo should they come upon the
message is intended by the author to be X and for the French
Resistance it is intended to be Y, and for the same marks on the
same paper. For Alexander, the search for meaning is empirical,
what was intended by real life humans. For OI adherents, author’s
intentions are not always ultimately determinative, by their
theory’s stipulation in fact. So sometimes meaning depends, for
Goldsworthy, on identifying a representative member of the
intended audience. And at that point I further agree with
Alexander and Kay that such an identifying task is an unavoidably
arbitrary process, despite Goldsworthy’s claim that “[t]his seems
to [him] an exaggeration.” (p. 185). Actually, it is arbitrary in one
sense, and in another sense we know before we start the “let’s
identify some representative member of the audience” task that it
is a process that is overwhelmingly likely to deliver up a
“representative audience member” who, when uncertainties
arise, will look a lot like the interpreter who went in search of him
or her in the first place—a lot like Scalia or Solum or Goldsworthy
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or whomever it is that happens to be doing the interpreting
through the prism of the “representative member of the
audience.”
2. Goldsworthy, as just noted, thinks the force of this
“arbitrary” point is over-stated. We should ask “what a wellinformed, intelligent and, competent lawyer at the time of
enactment would have understood the law to communicate.” (p.
185). Presumably Goldsworthy believes that will get rid of most
of the range of possible “OI meanings.” But I think Goldsworthy
is wrong. For instance, take any of the handful of statutory bills of
rights at the State level in my country of Australia. Off the cuff, I
can immediately think of a law professor (in favor of such
instruments where I am not) who would disagree with me about
what those statutes mean. So either one of us is not competent,
intelligent, or well-informed, or one of us is not basing his or her
views on the publicly available evidence of legislative intent. Or—
my position—the views and beliefs and value-judgements and
even sentiments of the interpreter, even one who is a “wellinformed, intelligent, and competent lawyer” (p. 185) matter.
Sometimes they matter a lot. There is a range or spectrum of
people who fall under the aegis of being reasonable, smart,
competent, and well-informed, and picking between them is, well,
arbitrary. (Nor would that fact surprise a Humean non-cognitivist
like me.)11 Moreover, we see this all the time, even with judges
who disagree, even with judges who claim to be originalists. So I
think both the arbitrary point and the “too many alternative
possible meanings” point are persuasive factors in deciding how
we should understand what meaning is. They push you towards
thinking SI is preferable to OI.
3. Here is another difficulty for Goldsworthy and the OI
position. I refer to the notion of “fault.” Goldsworthy makes clear
that OI is only supposed to kick in when the miscommunication is
the fault of the author, not when it is the fault of the listener or
listeners.12 I take it that if the miscommunication is the fault of the
11. See, e.g., JAMES ALLAN, A SCEPTICAL THEORY OF MORALITY AND LAW (1998)
(arguing for moral scepticism and a functional relationship between law and morality);
James Allan, Jeremy Waldron and the Philosopher’s Stone, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133
(2008) (responding against Waldron’s assertion for the use of international law for
American legal reasoning). For what it is worth, my guess is that Goldsworthy is also,
broadly speaking, a Humean non-cognitivist.
12. Goldsworthy makes this explicit: he says “through your fault not theirs” (p. 178).
“Your” refers to the maker of the utterance, and “theirs” the intended audience.
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intended audience, then for Goldsworthy the statement means
what the author intended it to mean. Hence, for OI adherents,
only if it is the author’s fault does the miscommunication result in
the statement meaning something other than what the author
intended. But this fault-based divide is obviously a problematic
distinction. Imagine a ninety-nine person audience. The author
intends his message to mean X. Fifty take it to mean X. Forty-nine
take it to mean Y. All base their choice on publicly available
evidence. So the OI meaning is X, and by numerical luck that
happens to line up with the SI meaning. Of course if it were 49-50
the other way, then the meaning would not be what the author
intended for Goldsworthy and the OIs. It would be what fifty out
of ninety-nine understood it to be based on the publicly available
information. For Alexander and the SIs, the meaning would still
be X, but the author should have done a better job
communicating. Put differently, the meaning would be stable for
Alexander, even if one audience member changes her mind about
what the author was trying to convey. What can vary for SI
adherents is whether the author’s intended meaning was in fact
successfully communicated, not the meaning itself.
Or go back to our ninety-nine person audience where fifty of
ninety-nine misunderstand the author and think Y rather than the
intended X. And now assume in my above scenario that the
audience’s median (or indeed any single person’s) IQ was 120,
and then start lowering it one IQ point a minute. Just when,
precisely, does the meaning of the author’s utterance change?
Because as you lower the median IQ or a single person’s IQ at
some point the miscommunication will become the fault of the
audience, at which point we are to suppose that the meaning
reverts to the SI one of author’s intended meaning. Meaning, in
other words, becomes hostage to the intelligence of the audience,
or at least to the author’s ability to discover that intelligence and
craft his method of communicating his intended meaning
accordingly. Or, we could cut through all of this and just say
“meaning” is stable, and whether an author is able to
communicate it successfully is variable and dependent upon a host
of factors.
At any rate, those are some of the grounds for why on the
theoretical plane I some time ago moved over to agree with
Alexander and prefer SI to OI. Or, if you would like to think of it
this way, the SI/OI difference comes down to there being, in rare
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situations, a serious problem for each position. In cases where the
difference matters (which Alexander, Goldsworthy, and Solum all
agree is seldom)—i.e., when there has been a mistaken
communication—once the mistake has been convincingly
discovered, SI calls for the enforcement of the “until recently
inaccessible” law that we now believe was intended (subject to
compensating reliance interests, of course, and not doing so if the
costs would now be catastrophic). OI avoids this problem, but at
the price of wanting to continue to enforce a law that no lawmaker
ever adopted or intended or legitimately brought into being. So it
is a kind of pick-your-poison situation. I am with Alexander and
Kay and Fish and a few others in the SI camp rather than with
Goldsworthy, Solum, and the more numerous OI/OPM strand of
originalism. That said, I also agree that, in practice, on the plane
of real-life interpreting, there is virtually nothing in it. The two
approaches overwhelmingly deliver the same outcomes, because
both look to what authors intend to convey.
Of course one can understand what is bothering many OIs in
terms of rule of law values. Alexander hints at this himself when
he gives this caveat: “Let me also put aside the possibility that a
legal system might have rules limiting legal interpretation to only
certain types of evidence.” (p. 422). If there were such rules, they
would flow from having done a cost-benefit analysis of when the
benefits of restricting the search for authors’ intended meaning
outweighed the costs. That, as I just said, is what seems to be
motivating the qualms Goldsworthy is feeling in the legal realm
about legislators’ subjective intentions. And that is all perfectly
understandable. Yet, in my view, it remains a mistake to say that
because of such concerns, and in some ineffable way, the
“meaning” of the legal text is not what the authors’ intended. I
think what is a better characterization is to be blunt and just say
that, for rule of law and other policy reasons in law (and as regards
legal interpretation), one might choose to lay down a rule (or
rules) that sometimes restricts the search for evidence of authors’
intentions. Alexander himself does not deny that such a step
might be defensible. Indeed, back in 2004, he and Saikrishna
Prakash made plain that in their view the only two plausible
games in town—and I am talking now specifically about legal
interpretation—are i) interpreters use all the evidence there is of
authors’ intentions, and ii) we restrict some of the evidence that
can be sought for various policy-based reasons (of the sort
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Goldsworthy focuses upon).13 Moreover, you can make that
choice between i) and ii) without undergoing some partial, limited
Damascene conversion that shifts your allegiance from SI to OI
in the legal realm. Rather, you just concede that other things
matter too, not just a law’s meaning, especially (or perhaps, only)
where the lawmaker has plenty of scope to try again, and this time
be clearer. Yes, there will be a cost in terms of authority and why
people should obey not the law, but instead this cost/benefit rule
that once in a blue moon gives us something different from the
intended law. But there will be rule-of-law benefits too. And no
doubt different people would, and do, strike different bargains
between i) and ii). At any rate, that is how I would characterize
what is going on and where the competing trade-offs lie.14
Returning to Part II of this fine book, the final two
contributions are by Laurence Claus and Alon Harel. Claus
focuses on interpretation in federalism disputes, and rightly
argues that enumeration of Congress’s legislative powers by itself
would never provide much, or at least enough, certainty. Such
grants of powers simply do not deliver rule-like determinacy. This
is a very interesting chapter, and Alexander agrees with Claus. In
Alexandrian terms, this is because “enumerated powers function
as standards, not rules. They must be given determinacy by
further lawmaking [by the court].” (p.426). Meanwhile Harel
agrees with the Alexander/Schauer line that the basic function of
13. See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 3.
14. And in line with that characterization of mine, I argued back in 2000 (in an article
that seems to have convinced absolutely no one) that there are solid grounds for making
different cost-benefit analyses as regards statutory interpretation and constitutional
interpretation. See James Allan, Constitutional Interpretation v. Statutory Interpretation:
Understanding the Attractions of “Original Intent”, 6 LEGAL THEORY 109 (2000). In other
words, I would be more open to restrictions vis-à-vis statutory interpretation than
constitutional interpretation, because the comparative costs of the lawmaker responding
to the interpreter (of over-riding the authoritative and legitimate source of law based on
some policy-related search-restricting rule) are so much lower with statutes. Put
differently, we should be much more open to restrictions as regards statutes, because there
is much, much more scope for the legislature to respond and say “you got our meaning
wrong by using these rule-of law enhancing presumptions, so we have passed a new, clearer
statute.” With constitutional interpretation, by contrast, you basically can never do that;
we know going in, indeed, the top judges doing the constitutional interpreting know going
in, that constitutional amendments correcting an erroneous imputed “meaning” that
results from some policy-related interpretive rule will not happen, or virtually never will
happen. Hence the costs of using a “let’s advance rule of law or keep costs contained” rule
will be considerably higher in constitutional interpretation while biting much less into the
authority of law as regards statutes, where there is a realistic chance the legislature will and
can reply.”
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law is settlement, and indeed with Alexander’s position that the
Supreme Court has to provide such settlement domestically. (p.
221). Harel then argues for there being a sort of intrinsic value to
constitutional settlement. (p. 228). Alexander at that point
demurs. (p. 426). My disagreement with that sort of
Kantian/intrinsic line of argument is much more fundamental, as
I have set out in a recent review of Harel’s book, Why Law
Matters.15
That brings me to Part IV of the book, which I can cover
much more quickly. Mitch Berman attacks Alexander’s claim that
there are no such things as legal principles. Emily Sherwin, Leo
Katz, and Alvaro Sandroni all discuss Alexander’s well-known
elucidation of what he dubs “the gap”—referring to the fact that
well-meaning and reasonable lawmakers have good grounds to
lay down general rules that their subjects will at some point have
good reason not to comply with. In utilitarian terms, so not
Alexander’s, Rule Utility will give good reasons for there being
rules that, if always followed by everyone, will deliver more
utility/welfare/happiness than if people make individual
calculations on their own on a case-by-case basis, and yet
situations will arise for all citizens when Act Utility points them
towards not following the rule, however much they factor in other
people’s reliance, the fact having the rule rather than not is
optimal, the criminal penalties for disobedience, everything.
There will always be this gap. Alexander says this dilemma is
insoluble. I think he is right. Meanwhile the whole discussion of
this problem, by the contributors and with Alexander’s take at the
end, is fascinating. That leaves the final two chapters in Part III,
one by Steven Smith and one by William Baude. Smith’s chapter
is excellent and funny, arguing that, in a way, Alexander is a closet
anarchist. Or rather, that is where Alexander’s relentlessly
analytical arguments—not least on the elusiveness of authority—
take him. Smith’s contribution is very sympathetic to Alexander,
and yet very convincing indeed as regards some of the
implications of the Alexandrian oeuvre. As for Baude, let me just
say that it is very seldom indeed that I read someone get the better
of an argument with Larry Alexander. In my view Baude does
just that in his chapter, even after considering Alexander’s reply.
Both are a treat, but Baude’s claim that Alexander cannot have
15. James Allan, Why Politics Matters—A Review of Why Law Matters, 9
JURISPRUDENCE 132 (2018).
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both the cake of judicial supremacy while also eating the truth of
originalism, convinced me, and I recommend the exchange to all
readers.
Let me conclude in an unusual manner. I have read many,
many of these sort of “compilation of different contributors’
chapters” type books. Not only is this one of the best of the lot; it
is also without doubt the book that, in my view, has the most
sympathetic, touching, classy, and just downright beautifully
articulated introduction I have ever come across. Heidi Hurd is to
be congratulated, not just on putting together this very fine book,
but in giving us the new high watermark when it comes to
introductions. Suffice to say that I would pay big money for her to
write one for me.

